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Abstract
Municipal amalgamation is often seen as one way to ensure that municipalities are large enough
to be financially and technically capable of providing the extensive array of services with which
they are charged. The idea is presumably that municipalities will be able not only to reap
economies of scale, but also to coordinate service delivery over the enlarged territory as well as
share costs equitably and reduce (even eliminate) spillovers of service delivery across local
boundaries. This paper evaluates the extent to which municipal amalgamation in Toronto,
Canada’s largest city, in 1998 achieved the provincially-stated objective of saving costs as well
as its impact on taxes, financial viability, and local access and responsiveness.
We conclude that the end result was the creation of a city that manages to be both too small and
too big at the same time. The amalgamation probably increased the financial viability of at least
the smaller and poorer municipalities in the newly created City of Toronto by increasing their
access to the tax base of the amalgamated city as a whole and it also equalized local services so
that everyone can enjoy a similar level of services. However, it had no significant effect on either
the financial sustainability of Toronto or its capacity to deal with financial crises, nor did it
achieve cost savings or solve any of the problems that the city and region faced in the last decade
and continue to face in this one. The new city remains much too small to address the regional
issues that plague the greater Toronto region (such as transportation and land use planning and
economic development) while resulting in resulted in reduced access and participation by
residents in local decision-making. On balance, it seems unlikely that anyone looking back with
knowledge of the small and questionable gains that appear to have been realized would willingly
have undertaken the complex, extended and painful process of metropolitan amalgamation.
Key words: local government, metropolitan area, amalgamation, municipal reorganization/
JEL codes: H11, H70, N42, N92
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1. Introduction
Municipal amalgamation is often seen as one way to ensure that municipalities are large
enough to be financially and technically capable of providing the extensive array of services with
which they are charged. The idea is presumably that municipalities will be able not only to reap
economies of scale, but also to coordinate service delivery over the enlarged territory as well as
share costs equitably and reduce (even eliminate) spillovers of service delivery across local
boundaries. Instead of enlarging municipal boundaries horizontally, another way to achieve these
legitimate objectives is vertically, either by shifting services upwards to existing higher levels or
by introducing a new tier of local government with larger units superimposed on top of existing
units. The ‘two-tier’ approach may be preferred, for example, because relatively small
government units are considered to play an important role in ensuring adequate local voice and
accountability. However, all these approaches in the end rest on the argument that larger
consolidated government units will produce better outcomes than small separate municipalities.
These issues have mainly been discussed in most countries with respect to the
governance of metropolitan regions, although no one-size-fits-all model has emerged from this
discussion (Bird and Slack 2008). As is often the case with institutional design, while the
questions to be dealt with may be universal, the answers are invariably context-specific, and
policy choices are seldom clear-cut (Stren and Cameron 2005). In particular, there appears to be
surprisingly little evidence of the actual impact of metropolitan amalgamation on costs and
service levels.
This paper assesses some aspects of the impact of municipal amalgamation in Toronto,
Canada’s largest city, in 1998.1 The next section briefly describes municipal governments in
Ontario and their financial circumstances over the past decade. The third section sets out the
history of municipal amalgamations in the province over the last 40 years. Against this
background, the fourth section provides a more detailed description of the convoluted history of
the recent amalgamation in Toronto. The fifth section evaluates the extent to which Toronto’s
amalgamation achieved the provincially-stated objective of saving costs as well as its impact on
taxes, financial viability, and local access and responsiveness. The sixth section concludes.

2. Municipal Finance in Ontario
Canada has three levels of government: the federal government, ten provincial and three
territorial governments, and over 3,700 local governments. Local governments are often referred
to as “creatures of the provinces” because Canada's Constitution assigns local institutions as a
provincial responsibility and each province has its own legislation governing municipalities.

1

Toronto has a population of 2.6 million and is situated in the Province of Ontario with a population of 13.5 million.
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Municipalities have only those powers that are delegated to them by the province in which they
are situated.
Municipalities in Ontario, as in other provinces, are largely responsible for delivering
such important services as protection (police and fire), transportation (roads and transit),
environmental services (water, sewers, and solid waste collection and disposal), social services
and social housing, recreation and culture, and planning. As Table 1shows, transportation (roads
and transit) is the largest expenditure in per capita terms followed by social services and
protection (fire and police). Unsurprisingly, per capita expenditures in Toronto, by far the largest
city, were almost 30 percent higher in 2011 than for all municipalities, particularly for
transportation, social services, and social housing.
By far the largest source of revenue for municipal governments in Ontario is the property
tax, which represents over 38 percent of total revenues across the province and almost 31 percent
in Toronto (see Table 2). The second largest source of revenue is grants, largely conditional
grants from the provincial government. Provincial grants to Ontario municipalities are higher
than in other provinces because social service costs, which are provincially funded elsewhere,
are shared in Ontario. User fees for services such as water and sewers, transit, and recreation
represent the third largest source of municipal revenue. Toronto is unique in the province in that
it has the ability to levy taxes other than the property tax.2 The City of Toronto levies a land
transfer tax and a billboard tax; it also levied an annual personal vehicle registration tax but it
was discontinued in 2011.
As Figure 1 suggests, the recent recession was considerably milder in Canada and in
Ontario than in other parts of the world. 3 Although municipal operating expenditures per capita
(in constant dollars) have declined steadily over the last decade or so, and there was a dip from
2008 to 2009, expenditures actually increased in 2010. Much the same happened with respect to
property taxes. On the other hand, although transfers increased slightly in 2008 and 2009, they
began to decline in 2010.
There are several reasons why Ontario municipalities did not noticeably suffer from the
recession. First, although municipalities often lament the extent to which they depend on the
property tax, that tax is much less responsive to changes in the economy than other taxes such as
income and sales (Bird, Slack and Tassonyi, 2012) both because property values do not change
as rapidly as incomes when there are changes in economic activity and because there is a lag in
assessment values.4 Second, a special federal Infrastructure Stimulus Fund provided many
2

Under the City of Toronto Act which came into effect on January 1, 2007, Toronto has the authority to levy any tax
with the exception of taxes on income, profits, capital, wealth (including inheritance taxes), machinery and
equipment used in research or development or manufacturing and processing, payroll, gasoline, natural resources,
energy consumption, general sales of goods, use of highways, and accommodation (including hotels, motels,
apartment houses, etc.). The city also cannot levy a poll tax. The city is permitted to tax alcoholic beverage
entertainment establishments, motor vehicle ownership, land transfers, parking lots, road pricing, and billboards.
3
Expenditures per capita for 2011 in Table 1 include some capital components; expenditures in Figure 1 only
include operating expenditures. A change in reporting requirements in 2009 make it difficult to compare operating
expenditures before and after 2009.
4
In Ontario, properties are re-assessed every four years and the assessment increases are phased in over a four-year
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municipalities with additional funding to invest in infrastructure in 2009 and 2010.5 Third,
although there were some negative impacts on municipalities from the decline in investment
income as a result of declining interest rates, investment income does not account for a
significant portion of municipal revenues. Fourth, municipalities in Ontario, as in the rest of
Canada, are not permitted to borrow to meet operating expenditures and borrowing for capital
expenditures is restricted. 6 Even though municipal borrowing increased in some municipalities
to finance their share of the federal infrastructure program, debt repayment costs are still well
below provincial limits for most municipalities.

Table 1: Municipal Expenditures: Ontario and Toronto, 2011
General government
Protection
Transportation
Environmental
Health
Social services
Social housing
Recreation and culture
Planning &
development
Other
Total expenditures

Ontario
$ per capita
154
506
643
420
150
494
176
11

%
5.3
17.3
22.0
14.4
5.1
16.9
6.0
0.4

Toronto
$ per capita
222
623
978
351
154
757
288
378

%
5.9
16.5
25.9
9.3
4.1
20.1
7.6
10.0

62
23

2.1
0.8

21
0

0.5
0.0

2,922

100.0

3,771

100.0

Source: Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Financial Information Returns

period.
5
One third of funds came from the federal government, one third from the provincial government, and one third
from municipal governments.
6
In Ontario, for example, municipal debt charges cannot exceed 25 percent of own-source revenues. Only the City
of Toronto does not face provincial restrictions on borrowing.
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Table 2: Municipal Revenues, Ontario and Toronto, 2011
Ontario
$ per capita
Own-source revenues
Property taxes
Payments in lieu of taxes
User fees
Licenses, permits, rents
Fines and penalties
Other
Total own-source
revenues

%

Toronto
$ per capita

%

1,271
44
646
81
44
431

38.1
1.3
19.4
2.4
1.3
13.1

1,276
35
833
178
61
486

30.5
0.8
20.0
4.3
1.5
11.6

2,517

75.6

2,869

68.7

Grants
Unconditional grants
Conditional grants
Total grants

48
718
766

1.4
21.5
22.9

0
1,153
1,152

0.0
27.6
27.6

Revenues from other
municipalities

49

1.5

37

0.9

3,333

100.0

4,176

100.0

Total revenues

Source: Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Financial Information Returns

Figure 1: Municipal Operating Expenditures and Selected
Revenues, Ontario Municipalities, 2000-11
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3. Municipal Restructuring in Ontario
Municipal restructuring in Ontario occurred in two waves. The first wave began when
Metropolitan Toronto was established in 1953 as a two-tier government with a metropolitan tier
and 13 lower tiers, as discussed further in section 4 below Subsequently, eleven additional twotier regional municipalities were created between 1969 and 1974, covering over one third of the
population of Ontario (Tindal and Tindal 2009). The idea behind the creation of Metro Toronto
and the other two-tier regional governments was to address such regional issues as land use
planning, transportation, social services, and policing at the upper tier level, leaving more local
concerns to be dealt with by the lower tier governments.
In 1974, however, municipal restructuring ceased. It began again with a second wave
from 1991 to 2001 that reduced the number of municipalities in Ontario from 839 to 448.
Subsequent amalgamations reduced the number of municipalities to the present 444 (see Table
3). Many of the mergers during this period were imposed by the provincial government.
Although others were voluntary, in some cases they were undertaken in the belief that the
province would impose an amalgamation in any case. In a few instances, upper tiers were
merged with lower tiers to create single-tier cities from what were formerly two-tier structures.
The stated rationale for this second wave of restructuring was to save costs. It was argued
that fewer and larger municipalities would reduce municipal bureaucracy and inefficiency;
realize cost savings from economies of scale by reducing duplication and overlap in service
provision;7 provide clearer accountability; and accommodate the services downloaded in the
local services realignment (discussed next) by pooling resources, increasing fiscal capacity, and
creating stronger and more sustainable municipalities. A major realignment of local services in
1998 resulted in the transfer of full responsibility for many previously cost-shared services such
as water, sewers, roads, transit, social housing, public health, ambulances, and some increased
responsibility for social services to municipalities. In return, the provincial government
transferred responsibility for primary and secondary education from school boards as well as a
few services from municipalities to the provincial level and took over tax-rate setting for the
education portion of the property tax, which it then lowered to give municipalities more tax
room. 8
Three pieces of legislation led to these amalgamations. The first was the Savings and
Restructuring Act, 1995 which laid out a two-pronged approach (Tindal and Tindal 2009). First,
restructuring could be achieved if supported by a majority of the affected municipalities
containing a majority of the population and, in a two-tier structure, where a majority of members
of the upper tier council also agreed. If there was no local agreement, however, the second prong
provided that if even one municipality requested a change, the minister could appoint a
7

The extent to which consolidated local governments take advantage of economies of scale is debatable. For a
review of the literature on economies of scale, see Slack and Bird (2013).
8
A more detailed discussion of the local services realignment may be found in Bird, Tassonyi and Slack (2012). At
the time of the realignment, the outcome was assumed to be revenue neutral. However, in part because it did not
work out this way, some of the services downloaded in 1998 are currently in the process of being uploaded to the
Province e.g. court security, social assistance.
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commission with the authority to determine the new structure for the municipal area. This
provision was used in 1997, for example, to amalgamate the upper-tier county of Kent with its
constituent municipalities and the separated City of Chatham to create the first city-county
single-tier municipality, known as the Municipality of Chatham-Kent, even though 22 of the 23
municipalities affected were opposed to the amalgamation. The result of this restructuring was to
increase the pressure on other smaller municipalities to amalgamate lest the province appoint a
commissioner to do it for them (Tindal and Tindal 2009).
The second piece of legislation, the City of Toronto Act, 1997, was drafted to amalgamate
the upper-tier municipality of Metropolitan Toronto with its six constituent lower-tier
municipalities. This amalgamation is discussed in more detail in section 4 below. Finally, the
Fewer Municipal Politicians Act, 1999, led to the provincial appointment of special advisors to
study and report on restructuring options for four two-tier municipalities: Sudbury, OttawaCarleton, Hamilton-Wentworth, and Haldimand-Norfolk. The reports of the special advisors
resulted in five single-tier municipalities: the City of Greater Sudbury, the new City of Ottawa,
the new City of Hamilton, the County of Haldimand, and the County of Norfolk.
In 2001, however, the provincial government announced that it would no longer impose
amalgamations on municipalities. Under the current legislation (the Municipal Act, 2001), the
consent of all affected municipalities through their elected councils is required to gain provincial
approval for a locally initiated amalgamation. As a result, there have been few amalgamations
since 2001and little interest at either the provincial or municipal levels in going down that road.9
To the extent that municipalities are concerned about financial viability, they are looking for new
sources of revenue rather than joining up with their neighbours (Tindal and Tindal 2009).
Table 3: Municipal Structure in Ontario, 2013
Number of
Municipalities
Single Tiers
- Southern Ontario
- Northern Ontario
- Total single tiers
Lower Tiers
- Within a region
- Within a county
- Total lower tiers
Upper Tiers
- Region
- County
- Total
Total number of municipalities

144
29
173
43
198
241
8
22
30
444

Source: Found (2012)

9

Since 2001, there were only three more amalgamations that resulted in the creation of the Municipality of Charlton
and Dack in 2003, the City of Temiskaming Shores in 2004, and the Township of Gordon-Barrie Island in 2009.
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4. Toronto: From One Tier (Fragmented) to Two Tier to One Tier (Unified)10
Before 1953, the City of Toronto was surrounded by 12 municipalities, all of which had been
growing rapidly in the postwar period in large part because Toronto had no vacant land for the
single-family housing developments that accommodated most of the growing regional
population. 11 This growth placed huge demands on the capacity of these relatively small
municipalities to provide services. In addition, since these municipalities were largely residential
they did not have an adequate tax base to finance such needed infrastructure as educational
facilities, roads, sidewalks, lighting, and water and sewerage. The City of Toronto, on the other
hand, which had significant commercial and industrial property, had a solid financial base.12
In addition to this imbalance in service demands and resources, the political boundaries
of the City of Toronto no longer reflected the social and economic realities of the metropolitan
area (Kulisek and Price 1988). Although there was some cooperation with surrounding
municipalities, planning was restricted to the boundaries of the City of Toronto and further
problems arose because each municipality acted independently with respect to transportation,
land use, and housing—issues that needed to be addressed on a region-wide basis.
In response to these problems, in 1954 the province passed legislation to create
Metropolitan Toronto.13 The Metropolitan Toronto Act established a two-tier government with a
metropolitan tier and 13 lower-tier municipalities (the City of Toronto plus the 12 suburban
municipalities). The metropolitan government (Metro) was initially given responsibility for
planning, borrowing, assessment, transportation (transit and some roads), and the administration
of justice. Local area municipalities were responsible for fire protection, garbage collection and
disposal, licensing and inspection, local distribution of hydroelectric power, policing, public
health, general welfare assistance,14 recreation and community services, and the collection of
taxes. Both tiers shared responsibility for parks, planning, roads and traffic control, sewage
disposal, and water supply. Costs were shared on the basis of property tax base. This meant that,
in 1954, the City of Toronto picked up 62 percent of the costs of Metro.15
Over the next 40 years, other lower-tier responsibilities migrated to the Metro level.
Metro took over responsibility for police services, social assistance, traffic control and
operations, licensing, conservation, waste disposal, and ambulance services. In 1967, following
10

An earlier version of the impact of the Toronto amalgamation on expenditures and revenues was presented at a
workshop on Rethinking Local Government sponsored by the Government Institute for Economic Research in
Helsinki, Finland on October 2, 2012.
11
The 12 municipalities included the Towns of Leaside, Mimico, New Toronto, and Weston; the Villages of Forest
Hill, Long Branch, and Swansea; and the Townships of East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, and York.
12
As noted earlier, the only tax base open to municipalities in Ontario was real property and residential properties
have long been taxed much less heavily than non-residential (commercial and industrial) properties. For a detailed
examination of the development and operation of the Ontario property tax system, see Bird, Slack, and Tassonyi
(2012).
13
In Canada, all aspects of municipal government—boundaries, responsibilities, taxing powers—are completely
controlled by the provincial governments.
14
The costs of general welfare assistance are shared with the provincial government.
15
See the Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, cited in Sancton (1994).
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the recommendations of a provincial commission, the number of municipalities in Metro was
reduced from 13 to 6.16 Property assessment and the administration of justice became provincial
responsibilities in 1970.
Early reviews of Metro government applauded its success in meeting its intended
objectives: “the creation of a federated form of metropolitan government for the city of Toronto
and its 12 suburbs in 1953 and the rapidity with which it was able to overcome serious public
service deficiencies made the Toronto model an object of admiration for students of metropolitan
affairs throughout the continent” (Frisken 1993). The new governance structure provided the
necessary infrastructure for the orderly growth of the suburbs, maintained a vibrant core, and
pooled revenues over the whole metropolitan area. It solved the water and sewage treatment
problems, constructed rapid transit lines, established a network of arterial highways, built
housing for seniors, and created a Metro parks system.
Spillovers of benefits from transportation and planning were now contained within
Metro’s borders. Redistribution from the City of Toronto to the suburbs enabled the latter to
provide needed infrastructure. Local autonomy was achieved in part by differentiating local
services across the lower tiers: for example, waste collection in the former Village of Forest Hill
continued to be twice weekly instead of once a week, as it was in the rest of Metro.
By the 1970s, however, the nature of the problem had changed as expansion in the region
migrated outside the boundaries of Metropolitan Toronto. The problem was no longer to
accommodate growth within Metro but rather to deal with the reality that growth was
increasingly occurring outside Metro in what became known as the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).
The province’s first reaction in the early 1970s was to create four new two-tier regional
governments around Metro—Durham, Halton, Peel, and York – as part of the first wave of
amalgamation discussed in section 3. However, it was not until 1988 that the province
established the Office of the Greater Toronto Area (OGTA) to encourage Metro and the
surrounding regions to coordinate their efforts with respect to critical areas—waste disposal,
regional transportation, land use, and infrastructure planning. In addition, a forum of GTA
mayors (of the lower-tier municipalities) and chairs (of the regional governments) was
established to encourage and market economic development in the GTA.
Subsequently, in response to growing concerns about the future economic performance of
the urban region as whole, a GTA Task Force was established in 1995. The resulting report
emphasized the need to treat the entire GTA as a single economic unit with a unified economic
strategy and to create a new GTA governmental body not only to deal more effectively with
GTA-wide environmental and planning issues but also to share major infrastructure and social
costs (GTA Task Force 1996). The report also recommended that local government within the
GTA be simplified by creating a Greater Toronto Council for the region, eliminating Toronto’s

16

Forest Hill and Swansea were amalgamated with Toronto; New Toronto, Mimico, and Long Branch with
Etobicoke; Weston with York; and Leaside with East York. North York and Scarborough (with Etobicoke, York, and
East York) became the five boroughs which, together with the City of Toronto, constituted the Metro region.
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upper tier (Metro) as well as the other four GTA regional governments, and reducing the number
of lower-tier municipalities through further amalgamation.
In 1996, yet another expert group was appointed by the provincial government, the Who
Does What Panel. This group similarly called on the province to set up a governance structure
for the GTA as a whole. Specifically, it recommended the creation of a Greater Toronto Services
Board (GTSB), the elimination of the five upper-tier (metropolitan and regional) governments,
and the consolidation of some of the lower-tier municipalities into strong cities. However, there
was no consensus within the Panel on whether the six lower-tier municipalities in Metro Toronto
should be merged into one city or four cities.
Despite these recommendations by two different provincial commissions on the need to
coordinate service delivery between Toronto and its surrounding regions, the provincial
government chose instead to amalgamate the municipalities within Toronto. The stated rationale
was to save taxpayers’ money by replacing six lower-tier governments and the metropolitan level
of government with one municipal government—the new City of Toronto. Since in Canadian
municipal affairs, provinces get what provinces want, the result was that a new unified City of
Toronto was created by provincial fiat on January 1, 1998. The upper-tier (metropolitan)
government and six local area municipalities were merged into a single-tier city.
This restructuring did not arise from any local initiative. Indeed, opposition to the
proposed amalgamation came from many different quarters: local municipalities (both inside and
outside Metro Toronto), the opposition parties in the provincial legislature, citizen organizations,
and even from within the governing party itself (Stevenson and Gilbert 1999). Before the
legislation was passed, referenda were held in each of the lower-tier municipalities in Metro
Toronto. Although only 36 percent of eligible voters voted, opposition to the proposed
amalgamated City of Toronto ranged from 70 to 81 percent of voters, depending on the
municipality, with opposition centering on the loss of local identity and the reduced access to
local government. In addition, in the broader context of the GTA, municipalities outside Toronto
were concerned that Metro amalgamation would result in increased polarization within the
region.
Once Toronto was amalgamated, the provincial government established the Greater
Toronto Services Board (GTSB) initially suggested by the Who Does What Panel in 1996.17
However, the GTSB was given no legislative authority, except to oversee regional transit with
some limited powers to coordinate decision-making among its member municipalities and to
provide strategic growth management. It was not designed to be a level of government nor was it
given direct taxing authority. The GTSB comprised elected representatives from each of the
municipalities in the region. A 2001 review of the GTSB concluded that to have any real effect,
the role and powers of the Board should be strengthened significantly through provincial
legislation to include responsibility to develop a growth management strategy and to create a
transportation authority for the region that would address growing transportation concerns
17

The Greater Toronto Services Board Act (1998) set out the structure and responsibilities of the Greater Toronto
Services Board (GTSB).
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(Deloitte Consulting 2001). Later that year, however, the provincial government once again went
in a quite different direction and disbanded the GTSB. To this day, there is still no effective
regional governance structure in the Toronto metropolitan region.18
What regional governance there is in the GTA lies largely in the hands of the province.
For example, the provincial government has largely taken over responsibility for transportation
and land use planning for the Toronto region. Metrolinx (originally known as the Greater
Toronto Transit Authority) was created by the province to be responsible for transportation in the
region. Similarly, provincial legislation on growth management (the Places to Grow Act and the
Greenbelt Act, both passed in 2005) put the province squarely in charge of regional land-use
planning. The Places to Grow Act gives the province the authority to designate any geographic
region of the province as a growth plan area; develop a growth plan in consultation with local
officials, stakeholders, public groups, and members of the public; and develop growth plans in
any part of Ontario. The Greenbelt Act authorizes the provincial government to designate a
Greenbelt Area and establish a Greenbelt Plan for the Toronto region (defined more broadly than
the GTA). Moreover, as has long been true, the development of major water and sewer
facilities—essentially a provincial responsibility—continues to be a major factor in determining
where development actually takes place.
Within the new expanded City of Toronto, however, the governance structure was
substantially simplified. The City Council now consists of a mayor who is elected at large and 44
councillors elected in wards (constituencies). The defining feature of this model is the supremacy
of Council as the decision-making body, as the mayor has only one vote on council.19 In addition
to the strong community affiliation of most city councillors, community councils were formed to
deal with local issues pertaining to the community and neighbourhood (such as signs; traffic
plans; parking regulations; and fence, ravine, and tree by-laws) as well as to provide a place for
local input into council’s decision-making process. Community councils are composed of elected
officials representing between 10 and 12 electoral wards. Each member of council serves on the
community council that incorporates his or her ward.

18

There has been some sharing of costs, however. Following amalgamation, the provincial government introduced
pooling of the municipal portion of social service costs in the GTA. Because social service costs are much higher in
the City of Toronto than they are in the rest of the region, pooling (which the regions referred to as the “Toronto
tax”) meant that the regions were paying taxes for services in Toronto without having any say over how their tax
dollars were being spent. The obvious resentment on the part of the regions led to the gradual (and ongoing) phasing
out of pooling.
19
Under the City of Toronto Act, 2006, the mayor was given some additional powers, such as the ability to set the
council agenda for the coming term and to appoint members of a new Executive Committee that focuses on prioritysetting for council. The mayor has not been the given power to appoint and direct city officials nor to veto council
decisions, as in the U.S.-style “strong mayor” system, however.
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5. What has the Toronto amalgamation achieved?
Amalgamation in Toronto has resulted in the creation of a city that manages to be both
too small and too big (Slack 2005). The city is too small to address the regional issues that
plague the GTA (such as transportation and land use planning and economic development) and
too big to be very responsive to local residents. Moreover, it does not appear that amalgamation
has achieved the underlying provincial objective of saving costs.
Before amalgamation became a reality, it had not been on anyone’s agenda. Most
provincial government efforts had been directed at addressing regional issues across the entire
Greater Toronto Area. The OGTA, for example, focused on a strategic vision for the GTA and
the coordination of regional issues; the forum of GTA mayors and chairs concentrated on
economic development and marketing in the GTA; and the GTA Task Force and the Who Does
What Panel emphasized the need for a government body to cover the entire region. The major
policy concern was the coordination of service delivery across the region and, in particular, the
coordination of transportation and land-use planning, water provision, and waste management.
The creation of the new City of Toronto and the GTSB did not adequately address these
fundamental regional problems. The boundaries of the City of Toronto made it too small to
address the regional issues; the GTSB was not given sufficient authority to accomplish anything
and was soon dissolved. Regional land-use planning and transportation issues remain essentially
in the hands of the provincial government.
Cost savings?
The main stated rationale for Toronto’s amalgamation was to save money.20 At its
simplest, the argument that reducing the number of local governments will cut costs is true in the
sense that amalgamation usually reduces the number of politicians and administrators. However,
the amalgamation of municipalities with different service levels and different wage scales tends
to increase expenditures. In Toronto, potential cost savings were in any case fairly small, since
the three largest expenditures (welfare assistance, transit, and policing) were already Metro
responsibilities before the 1998 amalgamation.21 These three services accounted for 70 percent
of the total upper-tier and lower-tier expenditures combined. Potential cost savings were thus
limited to 30 percent of the total budget of the new city.
Some savings did occur, mostly from staff reductions. Between 1998 and 2002, about
2,700 positions were eliminated through amalgamation. Over the same period, however, an
additional 3,600 positions were added to improve service levels, for a net increase in
employment over the period (Schwartz 2004). Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the
extent to which these new positions may have been created in response to the amalgamation,
20

This section draws on Slack (2000).
The provincial government based much of its case on the potential savings from the Toronto amalgamation on a
study it had commissioned (KPMG 1996). This study, however, estimated cost savings in the area of policing, a
service that had already been amalgamated in 1967. The study also did not estimate the potential impact of the
harmonization of wages and salaries and services that would occur following the amalgamation.
21
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owing to the wide variety of other provincial initiatives affecting local government spending that
were also introduced in 1998, notably the Local Services Realignment discussed earlier.
To determine the long-term effect of amalgamation on local spending, we assembled a
data base of expenditures per household for four services—fire, garbage, libraries, and parks and
recreation—in constant 2008 dollars for the six lower-tier municipalities (and, for some services,
also for Metro) from 1988 to 1997 and for the amalgamated city from 1998 to 2008.22 We chose
fire and garbage expenditures because they were solely lower-tier expenditures before the
amalgamation. Although parks and recreation as well as libraries were also largely lower-tier
responsibilities, each had a small upper-tier component. These four services accounted for about
40 percent of the 30 percent of lower-tier expenditures where there was potential for cost savings
(i.e., those that were not already amalgamated at the upper tier).23
Another reason for focusing on these four services is that they were not affected by the
province-wide Local Services Realignment that also occurred in 1998. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to separate the impact of amalgamation from the impact of Local Services Realignment
for the downloaded activities.
For fire services, expenditures per household before amalgamation were much higher in
the City of Toronto than in the other municipalities. This difference likely reflects the higher
density of the downtown area and the concentration of commercial buildings. However, as
Figure 2 shows, the linear trend line for all fire expenditures (even in Toronto) was downwardsloping prior to amalgamation.24 After amalgamation, the trend is decidedly upward. Fire
expenditures have clearly increased since amalgamation. Of course, in some cases higher
expenditures may mean higher service levels; in other cases, they may reflect the increased need
for specialized services as new commercial growth took place outside the central business
district in the former City of Toronto. Unfortunately, no consistent and comparable information
on changes in either costs (e.g., wages) or service levels (e.g., response times) is available.
As Figure 3 shows, the trends for expenditures on garbage collection are similar. As with
fire services, these costs were higher in the former City of Toronto than they were in other lowertier municipalities before amalgamation. This difference likely reflects the fact that the City of
Toronto provided pick-up service to commercial properties, whereas other municipalities did not,
as well as the greater proportion of commercial properties in the City. Again, however, the trend
in expenditures on garbage collection was downward both in total and in the former City prior to
amalgamation, but turned upward following amalgamation. As with fire services, it is not clear
to what extent the expenditure increase reflects higher wages and salaries or higher service
levels. Interestingly, one municipality (Etobicoke) had contracted out garbage collection to the
private sector before amalgamation, and private-sector delivery of this service continued in that
part of the new city after amalgamation.
22

We are grateful to Adam Found for invaluable assistance in assembling and analyzing these data.
This estimate does not include the portion of libraries and parks that were already at the upper tier.
24
The dotted line in each graph shows the linear predicted trend for the newly amalgamated city from 1998 to 2008.
The solid line shows the trend for the Metro total (upper and lower tiers) from 1988 to 1997 and hence where the
pre-amalgamation structure would have ended up had the 1988 to 1997 trend persisted.
23
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Amalgamation also appears to have increased expenditures for parks and recreation
(Figure 4). For libraries, however, the previous downward trend in expenditures per household
continued after amalgamation (Figure 5), even though service levels almost certainly increased,
since access to the library system for the whole metropolitan area was much easier following the
amalgamation. This decline is especially noteworthy in a period in which the nature of public
library service changed markedly from handing out books to providing electronic and Internet
services.
In addition to the higher costs for services, municipal amalgamations generally result in
transitional costs, which are—as is perhaps to be expected (Flyvbjerg 2008)—almost always
higher than anticipated (Vojnovic 1998). If the transition is towards a more efficient, effective,
and accountable local government, then the costs may be more than offset by the benefits. If not,
transitional costs become an additional argument against amalgamation. One-time transition
costs in Toronto, for example, included the acquisition of new technology for financial, human
resources, and payroll systems; the renovation of existing facilities such as the Toronto City
Hall; and the hiring of technical and professional expertise in areas such as telecommunications
(City of Toronto 2000).25
In addition to the one-time costs, there are also costs associated with staff layoffs. One of
the major challenges of Toronto’s amalgamation has been the amalgamation of the seven
previous administrations: “the key post-amalgamation problem has been leading and controlling
the vast administrative behemoth that the amalgamation created” (Sancton 2004, 28). The task of
integrating the operations and services of the seven municipalities following amalgamation was
enormous. It required the creation of a new administrative and reporting structure; the
implementation of new information systems; the consolidation of corporate services, real estate
portfolios, and other functions; and the harmonization of human resources policies and
classifications (Côté 2009).

25

One-time transition costs were estimated to be $275 million at the end of 2000.
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Figure 2: Fire Expenditures Per Household - 1988-2008
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Figure 3: Garbage Collection Expenditures Per Household - 1988-2008
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Figure 4: Parks & Recreation Expenditures Per Household - 1988-2008
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Figure 5: Libraries Expenditures Per Household - 1988-2008
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Tax increases or decreases?
One way of considering the overall impact of amalgamation on financial sustainability is
to ask whether taxes increased or decreased as a result. On the whole, as Figures 6 and 7 show,
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taxes declined, particularly those on business property.26 Before amalgamation, residential
property taxes per household (in constant 2008 dollars) were highest at the Metro level of
government, which is hardly surprising since that level accounted for 70 percent of total
expenditures. Residential property taxes per household were next highest in the City of York, the
poorest municipality in Metro, and were lowest in Etobicoke and Scarborough. Although
residential property taxes per household were generally declining prior to amalgamation in the
lower-tier municipalities, they were rising in Metro. In 1998, residential property taxes increased
sharply because of the Local Services Realignment. The downloading of some services to
municipalities coupled with lower education property taxes (now levied by the province) resulted
in higher municipal property taxes. Despite this important change, however, as Figure 6 shows,
residential property taxes in the amalgamated city have declined slightly (in real terms) since
1998, with the result that residential property taxes after amalgamation appear to be roughly
what they would likely have been in the absence of amalgamation.
Before amalgamation, business property taxes per household were much higher in the
City of Toronto than in any of the other constituent municipalities, partly because of the City’s
much larger commercial and industrial tax base compared to the suburban municipalities and
partly because of the higher tax rates applied in the city. But business property taxes for the
amalgamated city have fallen since 1998 both because the amalgamated city is deliberately
trying to reduce the tax burden on business for competitive reasons and because of the way in
which the complex and changing set of provincial rules governing property taxes have affected
Toronto (Bird, Slack, and Tassonyi 2012).

26

In a more detailed empirical analysis of local tax competition in the GTA, Bird, Slack and Tassonyi (2012) find
that amalgamation had a significant negative impact on both residential and non-residential effective tax rates not
only in Toronto but in several neighboring jurisdictions (in some of which the business property assessment base
was also negatively affected).
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Figure 6: Residential Taxes Per Household - 1988-2008
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Figure 7: Business Taxes Per Household - 1988-2008
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Financial viability of lower tiers
Whenever there are many local government jurisdictions in a metropolitan area, there are
likely to be some rich communities and some poor communities. The rich communities are those
which have a more adequate tax base with which to provide services and in some instances may
not have very great demands for some services (such as education or social services). On the
other hand, the poor communities are those which may require more services but have only a
small tax base on which to levy taxes. An important equity rationale for amalgamation – though
not one much discussed in the case of Toronto’s recent amalgamation – might therefore be to
establish a larger government jurisdiction with a stronger administrative and fiscal base in order
to help all communities in a given area to provide adequate and perhaps similar levels of service.
To the extent that higher costs of services are associated with the equalization of service
levels, they are thus not necessarily bad. If some municipalities provide lower levels of services
than their citizens would prefer simply because they have inadequate resources, amalgamation
allows them to provide at least the same level of service as other municipalities in the region. Of
course, equalization in this sense means that costs are likely to rise, not fall. For example, poorer
municipalities such as York and East York had declining tax bases (assessments) and hence
relatively high residential property taxes but nonetheless relatively low expenditures in the years
before amalgamation. These cities presumably benefited from Toronto’s amalgamation by
becoming more financially viable in the sense that tax rates fell and expenditures increased.

Governance and citizen participation
Some authors have argued that one of the main failures of Toronto’s amalgamation has
been the decline in citizen participation (Golden and Slack 2006). Before amalgamation, the city
provided many opportunities for citizen participation (Toronto Transition Team 1999):
community development initiatives; direct contact with politicians; deputations to committees of
council and participation in public consultations on specific issues; opportunities for involvement
in council subcommittees and task forces; membership on municipal agencies, boards, and
commissions; involvement in partnerships, coalitions, and joint working groups among citizens,
business groups, elected representatives, and municipal staff.
Although governance processes remained transparent and accessible after amalgamation,
local government in Toronto is definitely less participatory than it was before amalgamation
(Côté 2009). The creation of a much larger city has reduced the opportunities for citizen
involvement. The creation of community councils was designed, to some extent, to improve
citizen access and participation. The councils were intended to be accessible to citizens and to
provide a forum for local concerns. In reality, however, community councils operate mostly as
local planning committees rather than as forums in which broader community issues can be
addressed (Golden and Slack 2006). The number of community councils was also reduced from
six to four in 2003, further reducing their accessibility to citizens. In addition, the councils
almost invariably address localized and individual interests rather than city-wide issues.
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The business community expected that amalgamation would create a more effective
entity for economic development and marketing (Stevenson and Gilbert 1999). Indeed, the
Toronto Board of Trade strongly supported the amalgamation on these grounds.27 A larger
government was thought to be more effective at promoting economic development by reducing
bureaucracy and duplication and eliminating inter-municipal competition. In reality, there is still
duplication, the bureaucracy faces persistent problems in merging both organizational cultures
and such governance tools as zoning by-laws, and inter-municipal competition between Toronto
and its surrounding municipalities persists.
The new City of Toronto Act did give the city somewhat more authority and autonomy
than other municipalities in the province. In particular, the Act gave the City the power to impose
“direct taxes,” although, as noted earlier, only a land transfer tax and billboard tax are currently
levied in response to the granting of these new powers.28 In addition, this legislation represented
a fundamental shift in the traditional relationship between the City and the Province, replacing
the prescriptive framework with broad permissive powers for the City. The Act recognized that
the City of Toronto was unique and gave it authority to negotiate directly with the federal
government rather than going through the Province, as it had done in the past and as other
municipalities still must do (Côté 2009). As a larger one-tier government with more powers, it
can play a stronger role on the regional, provincial, national, and international stage. In the late
1990s, for example, Toronto took the lead in bringing national attention to the issue of
homelessness and advocated for a new deal for cities nationally through the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities and the Big City Mayors’ Caucus (Côté 2009).
6. Conclusion
Since 1991, municipalities in Ontario have experienced a wave of municipal restructurings
that reduced their number from 839 to 444. The primary rationale of the provincial government
in directing and shaping these restructurings was to save costs by reducing waste and
duplication. In addition, the provincial government seems also to have thought that municipal
restructuring would result in larger municipalities that would be more financially viable and
capable of accommodating the provincial downloading of services (Found 2012).
The amalgamation of Toronto in 1998 probably did increase the financial viability of at
least the smaller and poorer municipalities in the newly created City of Toronto by increasing
their access to the tax base of the amalgamated city as a whole. It also equalized local services so
that everyone can enjoy a similar level of services. The amalgamation may have also had some
other benefits, for example, by giving Toronto a stronger presence in economic development and
a stronger voice with respect to municipal issues within the region and across the province and
country.
27

The Toronto Board of Trade is a voluntary organization with about 10,000 members from the business community,
including large and small businesses and individual members.
28
These taxes account for less than 1 percent of total revenues in Toronto.
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What the amalgamation did not achieve, however, is any visible cost savings. Indeed,
expenditures increased following the amalgamation for fire services, garbage collection, and
parks and recreation. These findings are not surprising. Although some duplication is obviously
eliminated with amalgamation, when municipalities with different service levels and different
wage scales merge, expenditures are likely to increase. When the fire departments of several
municipalities are amalgamated, for example, it is possible to reduce costs by eliminating a
number of fire chiefs. However, all fire fighters in the newly amalgamated municipality are
doing the same job and working for the same employer—the newly created city. Understandably,
they will want to be paid comparable salaries and benefits, and no one will be willing to take a
pay cut. Salaries and benefits tend to equalize up to the level of the former municipality with the
highest expenditures. This upward harmonization of wages and salaries generally outweighs any
cost savings.
Not only did the Toronto amalgamation not achieve cost savings, it did not solve any of
the problems that the city and region faced in the last decade and continue to face in this one.
The creation of the new city was largely irrelevant to the problems faced both by Toronto and by
the GTA as a whole in coordinating services. Regional issues need regional solutions that go
beyond Toronto’s boundaries. The problems currently facing the new City of Toronto are no less
significant now than they were before the city was created. The new amalgamated city has
neither made them go away nor made them any easier to deal with. Nor did the amalgamation
have any significant effect on either the financial sustainability of Toronto or its capacity to deal
with financial crises. At the same time, the amalgamated city seems clearly to have resulted in
reduced access and participation by residents in local decision-making. Although the new
structure appears now to be well accepted, and no one is urging a return to the past, on balance it
seems unlikely that anyone looking back with knowledge of the small and questionable gains
that appear to have been realized would willingly have undertaken the complex, extended and
painful process of metropolitan amalgamation.
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